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The decisions on the Yukos cases delivered by the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) in 
2009/2011/2014 and by an international arbitral tribunal administered by the Permanent Court of 
Arbitration (PCA Tribunal) in 2009/2014 call for a comparative analysis. The two judicial bodies 
arrived at highly divergent conclusions, in particular with regard to the amount of damages to be 
paid by Russia: according to the Tribunal, Russia had to pay compensation amounting to roughly 
50 billion USD, whereas the Court ordered Russia to pay about 2 billion EUR only. The general factual 
background to the ECtHR’s decisions and the PCA Tribunal’s awards was the same, though. Russian 
authorities had subjected Yukos to tax reassessments and related enforcement measures upheld by 
domestic courts. At the end of the day, Yukos was declared bankrupt and liquidated. The significant 
differences between the decisions can be attributed, at least to a certain extent, to the differing legal 
bases underlying the decisions. The ECtHR had to apply the European Convention on Human Rights 
(ECHR) and related additional protocols (ECHR-Prot.), i.e. human rights instruments, whereas the 
PCA Tribunal was bound to apply the investment protection provisions of the Energy Charter Treaty 
(ECT). The Tribunal classified the tax reassessments and related enforcement measures as a ‘creeping’ 
de facto expropriation (Article 13 ECT) whereas the Court held that these measures solely amounted 
to unlawful and disproportionate interferences with the right to property (Article 1 ECHR-Prot. 1). 
Accordingly, from the Tribunal’s perspective, Russia had to compensate the value of Yukos as a multi-
billion stock company. In contrast, according to the Court, Russia was obliged to refund unwarranted 
tax and enforcement fee payments only. The ECtHR also declared that Russia had violated the right to 
a fair trial (Article 6 ECHR). In contrast, the PCA Tribunal did not deal separately with due process 
violations even though it could have done so, e.g., under the ‘ fair and equitable treatment’ clause 
(Article 10(1)(2) ECT). A distinctive feature of the PCA Tribunal’s reasoning was the arbitrators’ ‘credo’ 
that Russia had intended mala fide to extinguish Yukos for political reasons. The Tribunal arrived at 
this conclusion on the basis of extensive testimony of fact witnesses called by the claimants. In contrast, 
the ECtHR abstained from any hypothesizing about political motives behind the taxation and related 
enforcement measures taken by the Russian authorities and affirmed by the Russian courts.
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I. Introduction
Yukos is still haunting Russia. According 
to media reports1, Belgium and France seized 
Russian bank accounts in mid-June 2015. The 
purpose of that seizure was to enforce final 
awards delivered by a PCA2 Tribunal in July 
20143. According to these three arbitral awards4, 
Russia has to pay about 50 billion USD to the 
claimants.
Another Yukos case5 was pending in parallel 
before the ECtHR6. The ECtHR also decided in 
favour of the applicant and held that Russia had 
to pay damages. However, the sum awarded to 
the applicant amounted to almost 2 billion EUR 
only.
This marked difference between the 
decisions, i.e. the PCA Tribunal’s final awards 
and the ECtHR’s judgments7, is striking because 
the general factual background was the same8. 
The significantly divergent outcome of the 
proceedings before the PCA Tribunal on the 
one side and the ECtHR on the other side calls 
for a comparative analysis of these cases. The 
astonishing discrepancies may be owing to the 
differing legal bases upon which the awards and 
the judgments rest.
In respect of the applicable substantive 
law, the ECtHR had to base its judgment on the 
European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR)9 
which is a regional human rights instrument. 
In contrast, the PCA Tribunal had to apply 
primarily the Energy Charter Treaty (ECT)10 
which is, in part11, an international investment 
law instrument.
Accordingly, the Yukos cases are quite 
illustrative with regard to investment protection 
through different fields of public international 
law, i.e. international human rights law on the 
one side and international investment law on the 
other side12. Both fields of law may be applicable 
to the same set of facts. Still, both fields of law 
may yield remarkably differing results13.
II. The facts of the Yukos cases
On the 3rd and 14th of February 2005 
respectively, Hulley Enterprises Limited (Hulley), 
Yukos Universal Limited (YUL) and Veteran 
Petroleum Limited (VPL) initiated arbitration 
proceedings against Russia. The claimants, 
i.e. Hulley, YUL and VPL, were controlling 
shareholders of OAO Yukos Oil Company 
(Yukos)14. Russia and the three claimants agreed 
that the arbitral Tribunal was to be administered 
by the PCA and that its seat should be in The 
Hague15. The proceedings before the ECtHR 
were not initiated by these three companies, 
Hulley, YUL and VPL, or any other former 
shareholder of Yukos. Rather the applicant was 
the stock company itself, i.e. Yukos or in full OAO 
Neftyanaya Kompaniya Yukos16.
The PCA Tribunal rightly noted that 
‘[t]he factual matrix of this case is complex’17. 
Nevertheless, the facts of the Yukos cases may be 
summarized as follows:
Shortly after the dissolution of the Soviet 
Union, the Russian government launched 
extensive privatization programmes. During 
these high years of massive privatizations of 
former state-owned companies in the 1990ies, 
Yukos was sold to private investors and finally 
emerged as the largest Russian oil company18.
Yukos adopted and applied a ‘tax 
optimization’ scheme on the basis of the Russian 
‘low-tax region programme’ the purpose of which 
was to promote economic development in rural 
areas19. A ‘Field Tax Audit Report’ for 2000-2003 
issued by the Russian Tax Ministry did not find 
fault with Yukos’ ‘tax optimization scheme’20. 
However, only a few months later, Russian tax 
authorities started to suspect Yukos of abusing 
the ‘low-tax region programme’21. Accordingly, 
between 2003 and 2006, the Tax Ministry issued 
five tax reassessments for the years 2000-2004 
which added up to about 24 billion USD of tax 
debts (including interest and fines)22.
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These tax reassessments were closely 
followed by a variety of enforcement measures. 
Shares, bank accounts and other assets 
belonging to Yukos and related companies 
were seized23. In addition, Russian authorities 
imposed surcharges for delayed payment 
of tax debts24. In 2004, Russia auctioned 
off Yugansneftegaz (YNG), i.e. Yukos’ core 
production subsidiary25, at the amount of 9.37 
billion USD although YNG had been valued 
at 15.7 and 18.3 USD by Dresdner Bank 
and at 16 and 22 billion USD by JP Morgan 
respectively26. The sole bidder was Baikal 
Finance Group which had been established 
shortly before the auction and which was 
swallowed by Rosneft, a Russian state-owned 
oil company, only within a few days after the 
auction27.
In 2006, a foreign bank syndicate initiated 
bankruptcy proceedings against Yukos in 
the course of which Yukos was declared 
bankrupt28. Yukos’ remaining assets were sold 
off in public auctions29 and acquired by Rosneft 
and Gazprom30 which is another Russian state-
owned corporation in the energy sector. At 
the end of the day, Yukos was liquidated31 and, 
henceforth, ceased to exist.
The aforementioned facts can be retrieved 
consonantly from the decisions delivered by the 
ECtHR and the PCA Tribunal. Nevertheless, 
the decisions differ quite remarkably with 
regard to the account of certain factual details. 
Apparently, both the ECtHR and the PCA 
Tribunal reported in-depth those additional 
factual details which were, from their respective 
point of view, relevant for the persuasiveness 
of the reasoning and the conclusiveness of 
the holding. In particular, the PCA Tribunal 
put special emphasis on those facts which 
were important for establishing that Russia 
had intended to destroy Yukos for primarily 
political motives.
III. The law
1. Procedural Law
The arbitration before the PCA Tribunal was 
initiated on the basis of Article 26 ECT, which is 
the ECT’s dispute settlement clause concerning 
disputes between an investor and a party to the 
ECT. According to Article 26(2)(c), (3)(a), (4)
(b), (5)(a)(iii) ECT, Hulley, YUL and VPL filed 
a request for arbitration under the UNCITRAL32 
Arbitration Rules33. Thus, the procedural law 
applicable to the dispute before the PCA Tribunal 
were Article 26 ECT and the UNCITRAL 
Arbitration Rules34. In addition, since the PCA 
Tribunal was seated in The Hague, the arbitrators 
had to take into account the mandatory rules 
of Dutch arbitration law as well35. In fact, the 
Tribunal rendered its final awards pursuant to 
Article 1049 of the Netherlands Arbitration Act 
of 198636.
In the Yukos case before the ECtHR, the 
applicant brought its application under Article 
34 ECHR. Accordingly, Articles 34 to 46 ECHR 
provided for the procedural rules. In addition, the 
Court had to adhere to the Rules of Court37.
2. Substantive Law
Pursuant to Article 26(6) ECT, the PCA 
arbitral Tribunal had to decide the dispute in 
accordance with the ECT and ‘applicable rules 
and principles of international law’. Among 
these ‘rules and principles’ to be applied by 
the Tribunal were treaty rules, in particular 
the VCLT38, as well as customary rules, in 
particular the law on state responsibility 
as reflected in the ILC39 Articles on State 
Responsibility40.41 The ECT is a multilateral 
treaty ensuring energy cooperation between 
European and Central Asian states on the 
basis of five pillars: free trade, free transit, 
investment protection, energy efficiency and 
dispute settlement42. Hence, the ECT combines 
familiar regulatory approaches of modern 
– 2065 –
Hans-Georg Dederer. The Yukos Cases. A Comparative Case Note on the ECtHR’s Decisions and the PCA Tribunal’s...
Free Trade Agreements (FTAs)43. The pivotal 
provision of the ECT in the Yukos cases was 
Article 13 ECT on expropriations. Article 13(1) 
ECT reads in relevant part:
‘Investments … shall not be ... expropriated 
or subjected to a measure or measures 
having effect equivalent to … expropriation 
… except where such [e]xpropriation is:
(a) for a purpose which is in the public 
interest;
(b) not discriminatory;
(c) carried out under due process of law; 
and
(d) accompanied by the payment of prompt, 
adequate and effective compensation.
Such compensation shall amount to the fair 
market value … at the time immediately 
before the Expropriation … became known 
… (hereinafter referred to as the “Valuation 
Date”).
… Compensation shall also include interest 
at a commercial rate … .’
This provision sets forth an individual 
right of foreign investors which can be enforced 
by investors themselves through arbitration 
proceedings against the host state as provided for 
under Article 26 ECT.
Pursuant to Article 34(1) ECHR, the 
substantive law to be applied by the ECtHR 
are the ECHR and its protocols. The ECHR is 
a multilateral human rights treaty. It sets forth 
the ‘classic’ civil and political rights with the 
exception of the right to property which is laid 
down in Article 1 of the first additional Protocol 
to the ECHR44 (ECHR-Prot. 1). In fact, Article 
1 ECHR-Prot. 1 played a central role for the 
ECtHR’s decision at hand. Article 1 ECHR-Prot. 
1 reads:
‘Every natural or legal person is entitled to 
the peaceful enjoyment of his possessions. 
No one shall be deprived of his possessions 
except in the public interest and subject to 
the conditions provided for by law and by 
the general principles of international law.
The preceding provisions shall not, however, 
in any way impair the right of a State to 
enforce such laws as it deems necessary to 
control the use of property in accordance 
with the general interest or to secure the 
payment of taxes or other contributions or 
penalties.’
In addition, the Court based its judgment on 
Article 6 ECHR which provides for the right to a 
fair trial. The ECT does not contain a provision 
similar to Article 6 ECHR. Nevertheless, the 
guarantee of due process and related guarantees 
are implied in general investment protection 
standards such as ‘fair and equitable treatment’ 
(Article 10(1)(2) ECT)45. However, for reasons of 
‘judicial economy’ the PCA Tribunal refrained 
from deciding on whether Russia also violated 
Article 10(1) ECT46.
IV. Procedural Issues
1. Issues specific  
to the ECtHR’s jurisdiction
In cases of disputes before international 
courts or arbitral tribunals, it is common 
for respondents to challenge the court’s or 
tribunal’s jurisdiction. However, parties to the 
ECHR will rarely be able to evade the ECtHR’s 
jurisdiction. According to Articles 32(1), 34 
ECHR, individuals may bring claims against 
any party to the ECHR for alleged violations of 
Convention rights.
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Nevertheless, in the Yukos case before 
the ECtHR, a peculiar jurisdictional problem 
arose whether the applicant, i.e. Yukos, was still 
existent as a ‘person’ claiming to be a ‘victim’ 
within the meaning of Article 34 ECHR. In 
fact, Yukos had filed its application in 2004. In 
the meantime, in November 2007, however, 
Yukos had been liquidated and removed from the 
register of companies47. Hence, Yukos had ceased 
to exist as a (legal) ‘person’ prompting Russia 
to contest the Court’s continuous jurisdiction 
ratione personae48. Indeed, ‘the primary purpose 
of the Convention system is to provide individual 
relief’49. This ‘subjective function’ of individual 
applications pursuant to Article 34 ECHR 
seems to imply that a pending case should be 
removed from the list if the applicant has ‘passed 
away’. However, the ECtHR correctly held that 
‘[s]triking the application out of the list under 
such circumstances would undermine the very 
essence of the right of individual applications by 
legal persons, as it would encourage governments 
to deprive such entities of the possibility to pursue 
an application lodged at a time when they enjoyed 
legal personality’50. The Court also referred 
to the ‘objective function’ of the application 
procedure under Articles 34 et seq. ECHR, i.e. 
to the Convention system’s ‘mission to determine 
issues on public-policy grounds in the common 
interest, thereby raising the general standards of 
protection of human rights and extending human 
rights jurisprudence throughout the community 
of Convention States’51. To put it more generally, 
the ECtHR continues to have jurisdiction in order 
to elucidate human rights issues which transcend 
the individual gravamen in the given case even if 
the applicant has ceased to exist.
2. Issues specific  
to the PCA Tribunal’s jurisdiction
The liquidation of Yukos entailing its ‘death’ 
as a legal person did not become a jurisdictional 
problem before the PCA arbitral Tribunal because 
the claimants who had initiated the arbitration 
proceedings before the PCA Tribunal, i.e. Hulley, 
YUL and PVL, were controlling shareholders of 
Yukos and still ‘alive’. Nevertheless, Russia as 
respondent state in the Yukos cases before the 
PCA Tribunal raised several objections to the 
Tribunal’s jurisdiction.
Russia had never ratified but only signed the 
ECT.52 Thus, it had to apply the ECT provisionally 
pursuant to Article 45(1) ECT53. Although Russia 
terminated the provisional application of the 
ECT in accordance with Article 45(3)(a) ECT54 
by notification of 20 August 200955 during 
the pendency of the arbitration proceedings, 
the ECT’s investment protection and dispute 
settlement chapters were, and are, still applicable 
until 18 October 2029 inclusive (see Article 45(3)
(a) and (b) ECT)56.
Accordingly, Russia did not, and could not 
reasonably, deny that the ECT was applicable 
in principle and, accordingly, that the dispute 
settlement clause of Article 26 ECT might apply 
as a jurisdictional basis. However, Russia invoked 
the so-called ‘Limitation Clause’ of Article 45(1) 
ECT according to which57 the ECT provisionally 
applied ‘only to the extent that such provisional 
application is not inconsistent with [the Russian 
Federation’s] constitution, laws or regulations’. 
Russia maintained that, according to Article 
45(1) ECT and its Limitation Clause, a provision 
of the ECT was applicable on a provisional basis 
only if the respective provision was in conformity 
with Russian law58. According to Russia, the 
dispute settlement clause of Article 26 ECT was 
inapplicable, and Russia, therefore, not subject 
to the PCA Tribunal’s jurisdiction, because 
‘[t]he Russian Federation’s Civil Procedure Code, 
Arbitrazh Procedure Code and Tax Code confirm 
the exclusive jurisdiction of Russian courts over 
these issues, and prohibit their arbitration’59. In 
short, Russia argued that Russian (procedural) 
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law trumped Article 26 ECT making Article 
26 ECT inapplicable. However, the Tribunal 
held that ‘Article 45(1) requires an analysis 
and determination of whether the principle of 
provisional application per se is inconsistent 
with the Constitution, laws or regulations of the 
Russian Federation’60 and, finally, concluded 
‘that the principle of provisional application [per 
se] is perfectly consistent with the Constitution, 
laws and regulations of the Russian Federation’61. 
Thus, the ECT was provisionally applicable. 
Accordingly, the PCA Tribunal had jurisdiction 
to decide the Yukos cases on the basis of Article 
26 ECT.
Typical jurisdictional issues of investment 
arbitrations are whether the claimants are 
‘investors’ and whether the disputes arise from an 
‘investment’. In fact, Article 26(1), (3)(a) ECT lays 
down that only ‘[d]isputes between a Contracting 
Party and an Investor of another Contracting 
Party relating to an Investment of the latter’ may 
be submitted to international arbitration. Thus, 
the PCA Tribunal had jurisdiction pursuant 
to Article 26 ECT only if the claimants, i.e. 
Hulley, YUL and PVL, were ‘investors’ within 
the meaning of Article 26(1) in conjunction with 
Article 1(7) ECT, and if the dispute related to 
an ‘investment’ within the meaning of Article 
26(1) in connection with Article 1(6) ECT. In line 
with well-established investment arbitration case 
law, the PCA Tribunal relied on a formal textual 
approach to answer these questions.
Russia questioned whether the claimants 
were ‘investors’ within the meaning of said 
provisions because the three companies, albeit 
established in another contracting state, were still 
controlled by Russian nationals62. However, the 
PCA Tribunal correctly pointed to the wording 
of Article 1(7)(a)(ii) ECT according to which 
the sole decisive criterion was that the claimants 
were companies ‘organized in accordance with 
the law applicable in [a] Contracting Party’ 
other than Russia63. Article 1(7)(a)(ii) ECT is 
based on the so-called ‘incorporation theory’ 
and the PCA Tribunal rightly stated ‘that the 
reference to the State of incorporation is the most 
common method of defining the nationality of 
a company’64. Accordingly, the PCA Tribunal 
rejected to apply the ‘control theory’65 and 
rightfully referred to investment arbitration 
precedents66. Its reasoning is, moreover, also in 
line with the ICJ’s jurisprudence on nationality 
of corporations67 although it did not mention the 
leading Barcelona Traction case.
The PCA Tribunal also sided with the 
claimants as regards the question whether the 
dispute arose out of an ‘investment’ within the 
meaning of Article 26(1) in connection with 
Article 1(6) ECT. The claimants, i.e. the three 
companies Hulley, YUL and PVL, simply owned 
shares of Yukos68. According to Article 1(6)(c) 
ECT, ‘every kind of asset’, especially ‘shares’ 
constitute an ‘investment’ within the meaning 
of Article 1(6) ECT. Again, the PCA Tribunal 
rightly referred to the wording which ‘does not 
include any additional requirement with regard 
to the origin of capital or the necessity of an 
injection of foreign capital’69. So, contrary to the 
argument proposed by Russia, the PCA Tribunal 
considered the fact that the ‘ultimate source’ of 
the shares was Russian capital to be irrelevant70.
The PCA Tribunal also rejected Russia’s 
argument that the (alleged) illegality of the 
claimants’ investment deprived the Tribunal of 
jurisdiction71. It accepted, however, that ‘[a]n 
investor who has obtained [sic!] an investment in 
the host State only by acting in bad faith or in 
violation of the laws of the host state … should 
not be allowed to benefit from the [ECT]’72. 
Illegality not ‘in the making of the investment 
but … in its performance’, i.e. illegality only ‘in 
the course of [the] investment’, does not bar the 
investor form invoking the ECT, though73. In the 
Tribunal’s opinion, Russia was simply not able 
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to demonstrate that the making of the claimants’ 
investment, i.e. the purchase of Yukos shares, was 
unlawful74.
3. Related issues of jurisdiction or 
admissibility respectively
a) Local remedies
According to Article 35(1) ECHR, the 
exhaustion of local remedies is a criterion for 
the admissibility of applications under Article 
34 ECHR. The ECtHR reiterated that ‘there 
is no obligation to have recourse to remedies 
which are inadequate or ineffective’75. Obviously, 
with regard to certain enforcement measures, 
the applicant, i.e. Yukos, had not exhausted all 
domestic remedies available under Russian law76. 
However, the ECtHR held that remedies lodged by 
the applicant would not have had ‘any [additional] 
prospects of success’77.
The PCA Tribunal also referred to the 
so-called ‘local remedies rule’ albeit in another 
and somewhat complicated context. A complex 
jurisdictional issue in the Yukos cases before 
the PCA Tribunal was that, pursuant to Article 
26(1) ECT, disputes must ‘concern an alleged 
breach of an obligation … under Part III’ of the 
ECT. In fact, the claimants contended that Russia 
had breached Article 13 ECT. Russia, however, 
asserted that claimants challenged taxation 
measures which were not covered by the ECT 
pursuant to the ‘carve-out’ provision of Article 
21(1) ECT. ‘Carve-outs’ are generally defined 
as ‘[a]n explicit exception to a broad rule’.78 
According to Article 21(1) ECT, ‘nothing in [the 
ECT] shall create rights or impose obligations 
with respect to Taxation Measures’. Nevertheless, 
the PCA Tribunal held that it had jurisdiction over 
claims under Article 13 ECT. From the Tribunal’s 
point of view, Article 21(1) ECT was inapplicable 
in the present case because it ‘appl[ied] only to 
bona fide taxation actions’79. However, according 
to the PCA Tribunal, ‘[t]he tax assessments levied 
against Yukos by the Russian Federation … were 
essentially aimed at paralyzing Yukos rather than 
collecting taxes’80. In the alternative, assuming 
that Article 21(1) ECT was applicable, the PCA 
Tribunal referred to the ‘claw-back’ clause of 
Article 21(5) ECT. The legal effect of a ‘claw-back’ 
clause within a ‘carve-out’ clause is to exclude 
certain aspects from the scope of application 
of the ‘carve-out’. According to Article 21(5)(a) 
ECT, ‘Article 13 shall apply to taxes’81. 
In addition, the PCA Tribunal also opined 
that the claimants were not obliged to follow 
Article 21(5)(b) ECT, i.e. to refer the issue of 
whether the taxation measures constituted an 
expropriation to the competent Russian tax 
authorities. Since any such referral ‘would 
clearly have been futile’82. This finding is closely 
related to considerations which may be made 
in the context of the ‘local remedies rule’83. In 
fact, in its reasoning concerning Article 21(5)(b) 
ECT, the PCA Tribunal explicitly referred ‘to the 
exhaustion of local remedies requirement’ and 
explained that ’[i]t has long been recognized … 
that following a prescribed procedure may be 
dispensed with under circumstances where doing 
so clearly would not produce the result that the 
procedure seeks to achieve’84.
b) Parallel submissions
Another criterion concerning the 
admissibility of applications submitted under 
Article 34 ECHR is that, pursuant to Article 
35(2)(b) ECHR, any such application must not 
be ‘substantially the same as a matter that … has 
already been submitted to another procedure of 
international … settlement’85. The purpose of this 
provision is ‘to avoid the situation where several 
international bodies would be simultaneously 
dealing with applications which are substantially 
[sic!] the same’86. Applying its well-established 
‘similarity’ test87, the Court had no difficulties with 
concluding ‘that the cases are not “substantially 
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the same”’88. Since the claimants before the PCA 
Tribunal and the applicant before the ECtHR 
were separate and, thus, different legal entities89.
The problem of parallel submissions of 
claims also arose before the PCA Tribunal under 
the so-called ‘fork-in-the-road’ clause of Article 
26(3)(b)(i) ECT. On the basis of the ‘triple identity’ 
test the PCA Tribunal concluded that Article 
26(3)(b)(i) ECT was not triggered by proceedings 
initiated by Yukos before the ECtHR90.
4. Evidence
A marked difference between the PCA 
Tribunal’s awards and the ECtHR’s decisions 
concerns the gathering and analysis of evidence. 
The ECtHR operates rather like a constitutional 
court91. In general, proceedings are in writing 
only92. Just occasionally, the Court holds public 
hearings pursuant to Article 40(1) ECHR93. In 
the Yukos case, a public hearing on the merits 
took place in accordance with Rule 59(3) of the 
Rules of Court94. In addition, also in the merits 
phase, the Court invited the parties to submit 
additional written observations according to 
Rule 59(1) of the Rules of Court95. However, the 
Court apparently did neither ask the parties to 
file further ‘evidence’ in accordance with Rule 
59(1) of the Rules of Court nor entered into an 
investigation within the meaning of Article 38 
ECHR in conjunction with Rules A1 et seq. of the 
Rules of Court.
In contrast, on the basis of the UNCITRAL 
Arbitration Rules, the PCA Tribunal in the 
Yukos cases acted more like a civil court of first 
instance. Pursuant to Article 27(1) UNCITRAL 
Arbitration Rules, parties to the dispute have 
to prove the facts relied upon to support their 
claims or defence. Consequently, in accordance 
with Article 27(2)(1) UNCITRAL Arbitration 
Rules, parties may present witnesses. According 
to Article 27(4) UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules, 
it will be the arbitrators’ task to ‘determine the 
admissibility, relevance, materiality and weight of 
the evidence offered’. As set out in Article 28(1), 
(2) UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules, the witnesses 
may be heard in an oral hearing.
Hence, the PCA Tribunal reports elaborately 
on witness testimony96. It stresses explicitly that its 
award on the merits is based on a ‘vast evidentiary 
foundation’97 and carefully notes that it had to 
study ‘over 1,400 pages of written testimony’ and 
to inspect ‘thousands of exhibits’98. 
In the merits phase, both claimants and 
Russia submitted statements from a total of 22 
witnesses99. Among these witnesses were fact 
witnesses and experts100. Most of the witnesses 
also appeared before the Tribunal for cross-
examination101. The majority of claimants’ 
witnesses were former senior or high level 
employees of Yukos.102 Claimants’ list of 
witnesses also included a former chief economic 
advisor to the Russian president103, a damages 
expert104, an international tax law expert105, the 
defence lawyer of Mr. Khodorkovsky, the former 
CEO of Yukos,106 and a human rights activist and 
former State Duma Deputy107. Russia’s witnesses 
were international experts only, some of them 
working at leading foreign research institutions 
of worldwide reputation. They provided expertise 
in the field of valuation of companies108, tax law109, 
corporate law110, accounting111, audit112, Cypriote 
law113 and Dutch law114. 
The witnesses’ testimonies focused 
on Yukos’ compliance with, or abuse of, 
Russian law, in particular with regard to 
the ‘tax optimization’ scheme, the question 
of whether the tax reassessments and the 
related enforcement measures were politically 
motivated with the intention to destruct Yukos, 
the valuation of the damage and the reasons 
for PricewaterhouseCoopers’ withdrawal of its 
audits.
The PCA Tribunal uses 300 pages115, i.e. half 
of the arbitral award on the merits, for analysing 
– 2070 –
Hans-Georg Dederer. The Yukos Cases. A Comparative Case Note on the ECtHR’s Decisions and the PCA Tribunal’s...
the evidentiary record and determining the facts 
of the case many of which were highly contested 
between the parties116. It arrived at the following 
determination of facts:
– ‘in using the available tax benefit 
legislation in the Russian Federation, 
the Yukos group principally availed 
itself of facilities under the [Russian] 
laws’117,
– ‘the primary objective of the Russian 
Federation was not to collect taxes but 
rather to bankrupt Yukos and appropriate 
its valuable assets’118,
– ‘intimidation and harassment not only 
disrupted the operations of Yukos but 
also contributed to its demise and thereby 
damaged Claimants’ investment’119,
– ‘Sibneft wanted out of the merger after 
the arrest of Mr. Khodorkovsky’; ‘[t]he 
Tribunal does not see the fingerprints of 
[Russia] in Sibneft’s decision … or in 
Sibneft’s subsequent announcement that 
it would not proceed with the merger’120, 
though,
– ‘[Russia’s] total failure to engage with 
any of Yukos’ settlement proposals raises 
significant doubts in the Tribunal’s mind 
as to whether [Russia’s] true and sole 
concern in its dealings with Yukos after 
the tax assessments were issued was the 
collection of taxes’121,
– ‘the auction of YNG was not driven 
by motives of tax collection but by the 
desire of the State to acquire Yukos’ 
most valuable asset and bankrupt Yukos. 
In short, it was in effect a devious and 
calculated expropriation by [Russia] of 
YNG’122,
– ‘[i]t was “rather obvious” to the ECtHR 
that the choice of YNG as the first Yukos 
asset to be auctioned to satisfy Yukos’ tax 
debts was “capable of dealing a fatal blow 
to its ability to survive the tax claims and 
to continue its existence.”’123,
– ‘initiating bankruptcy was not a goal 
of the Western Banks, but rather the 
objective of Rosneft, in the interests of 
its owner, the Russian Federation. The 
Tribunal concludes that in the end the 
bankruptcy was initiated by the Russian 
Federation’124, 
– ‘the totality of the bankruptcy proceedings 
… were not part of a process for the 
collection of taxes but rather, as submitted 
by Claimants, indeed the “final act of 
the destruction of the Company by the 
Russian Federation and the expropriation 
of its assets for the sole benefit of the 
Russian State and State-owned companies 
Rosneft and Gazprom.”’125,
– ‘PwC was clearly pressed by the 
Russian authorities to find grounds for 
withdrawing its audits of Yukos’126
– ‘Yukos was the object of a series of 
politically-motivated attacks by the 
Russian authorities that eventually led to 
its destruction’127.
It is practically impossible from the outside 
to establish whether the Tribunal ascertained the 
factual events correctly. In any case, the Tribunal 
tried to substantiate why it found witnesses and 
other evidence to be credible and submissions 
by the parties convincing. Interestingly enough, 
the PCA Tribunal also referred to, and agreed 
to, findings by the ECtHR as well as by other 
investment arbitral tribunals128. Obviously, 
the Tribunal cited those authorities in order to 
augment the persuasiveness of its reasoning.
It should be noted, however, that the ECtHR 
drew a completely divergent conclusion with 
regard to Yukos’ allegation that the taxation 
measures and enforcement proceedings were 
conducted abusively and with the malicious 
intention to destroy Yukos for political reasons. 
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The Court was well aware that ‘the case attracted 
massive public attention and that comments of 
different sorts were made by various bodies and 
individuals in this connection’129. However, in the 
end, it emphasized that ‘those statements were 
made within their respective context and that as 
such they are of little evidentiary value [sic!] for 
the purposes of Article 18 of the Convention’130. 
That provision restrains parties to the ECHR 
from applying ‘restrictions permitted under this 
Convention to the said rights and freedoms … for 
any purpose other than those for which they have 
been prescribed’.
The marked difference between the 
ECtHR’s factual findings on the one side and 
the PCA Tribunal’s factual findings on the other 
side (especially with regard to the question 
whether Russia intended to exterminate Yukos for 
political reasons) seem to be attributable to the 
differing procedures followed by the two judicial 
bodies. The extensive testimony of fact witnesses 
called by the claimants certainly had a decisive 
influence on the arbitrators’ one-sided view of 
the facts. The Tribunal noted not just once ‘that 
the Russian Federation called no fact witnesses of 
their own to contradict or weaken the testimony 
of Claimants’ fact witnesses’131.
The aforementioned findings by the PCA 
Tribunal were highly unfavourable to Russia. 
Summarily, as a rule, the PCA Tribunal 
inclined to side with claimants’ view of the 
facts, especially with regard to the allegation 
that Russia’s sole intention was the politically 
motivated extermination of Yukos.
V. Substantive issues
The core substantive issue in the Yukos 
cases was whether the measures taken by Russian 
authorities, i.e. the tax reassessments and the 
subsequent enforcement measures, amounted 
individually or in combination to an expropriation. 
In line with general public international law132, 
neither the ECHR (including ECHR-Prot. 1) nor 
the ECT prohibit expropriations. However, under 
both the ECHR and the ECT, expropriations 
must meet certain requirements. In particular, 
any expropriation, be it a de iure (or: direct) 
expropriation, be it a de facto (or: indirect) 
expropriation133, requires the payment of due 
compensation.
1. Property
a) The PCA Tribunal’s holding: unlawful  
de facto expropriation
The PCA Tribunal held that Russia had 
breached Article 13 ECT134. In a nutshell, the 
PCA Tribunal’s ‘theory’ is that Russia intended 
to destroy Yukos for political reasons through 
a series of unlawful mistreatment at the end of 
which Yukos was declared bankrupt and, finally, 
was liquidated. Accordingly, from the Tribunal’s 
point of view, depriving the company of all its 
assets gradually was an essential means to 
extinguish Yukos. This article will not engage in 
an assessment whether this ‘theory’ is correct. 
Rather, we would like to review the PCA 
Tribunal’s reasoning which, occasionally, from 
a doctrinal perspective seems to be somewhat 
weak.
aa) Problems surrounding  
the finding of a de facto expropriation
Firstly, the PCA Arbitral Tribunal conceded 
that Russia ‘has not explicitly expropriated Yukos 
or the holdings of its shareholders’135. Obviously, 
the PCA Tribunal was not aware of any de iure 
expropriation. However, in the Tribunal’s view, 
the measures taken by Russian authorities in 
respect of Yukos ‘had an effect “equivalent to 
nationalization or expropriation”’136. Thus, Yukos 
had incurred a de facto expropriation. However, 
at this point of the award, the PCA Tribunal 
does not provide any reasons supporting its 
conclusion. Rather, the Tribunal simply refers 
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to ‘the measures that Respondent has taken 
in respect of Yukos, set forth in detail in Part 
VIII”’137. Apparently, the Tribunal followed 
the claimants’ argument that the measures 
tantamount to an expropriation consisted of ‘a 
series of “coordinated and mutually reinforcing 
actions”’138. These actions included, according 
to the PCA Tribunal’s findings, in particular the 
seizure of claimants’ shares, the harassment of 
Yukos’ employees (which contributed to Yukos’ 
inability to pay its tax debts), the sale by auction 
of YNG, the bankruptcy proceedings resulting 
in the acquisition of Yukos’ remaining assets 
by Rosneft and Gazprom and the liquidation of 
Yukos.139.
Secondly, the PCA Tribunal is very short 
on whether the de facto expropriation was for 
a purpose in the public interest as required 
by Article 13(1)(1)(a) ECT. It held that the 
‘destruction’ of Yukos ‘was in the interest of the 
largest State-owned oil company, Rosneft, which 
took over the principal assets of Yukos …, but 
that is not the same as saying that it was in the 
public interest … of the Russian Federation’140. 
On the other hand, transferring ownership to 
a private entity, even more to a state-owned 
enterprise, does not rule out per se that the 
expropriation may well be for some legitimate 
public policy objective141.
Thirdly, the Tribunal does not set out the 
legal standards for an ‘expropriation’ within 
the meaning of Article 13 ECT. Obviously, the 
parties agreed that the investor’s ‘legitimate 
expectations’ is a decisive criterion to establish 
expropriation142. Accordingly, the PCA Tribunal 
applied the ‘legitimate expectations’ test. However, 
it did not explicate the elements of that test in 
abstract terms. Rather, the Tribunal explained 
what the expectations of the claimants may, and 
should, have been and that the measures taken 
by the Russian authorities went far beyond those 
expectations: ‘the expectations of Claimants may 
have been, and certainly should have been, that 
Yukos’ tax avoidance operations risked adverse 
reaction from Russian authorities. … They could 
not have been expected to anticipate that they 
risked the evisceration of their investments and 
the destruction of Yukos’, though143.
This application of the ‘legitimate 
expectations’-test is somewhat peculiar. With 
regard to the concept of de facto expropriations, 
the ‘legitimate expectations’-test concerns the 
frustration of the investor’s expectation that the 
legal framework relating to its investment will not 
be changed to the investor’s detriment, making its 
investment become an empty shell devoid of any 
meaningful attributes of property144. According 
to the PCA Tribunal, the claimants could expect 
that the Russian authorities would not overreact 
in the face of Yukos’ tax evasion scheme. From 
the Tribunal’s point of view, by driving Yukos 
into bankruptcy and liquidation, the Russian 
authorities did not meet that expectation. The 
Tribunal, however, did not ask the question 
whether expectations were ‘legitimate’ at all. 
Are an investor’s expectations ‘legitimate’ if the 
investor makes use of tax relief rules in such a 
dubious way that the investor, purposely or 
negligently, takes the risk of being brought to 
justice or even criminally prosecuted? In fact, 
the PCA Tribunal itself noted that there were 
‘indications in the record that Yukos itself had 
doubts, or at least apprehensions, about the legality 
of aspects of its modus operandi’145 and that ‘the 
absence of a prior legal opinion supporting the 
propriety of Yukos’ arrangements in the low-tax 
jurisdictions is striking and may be suggestive’146. 
The PCA Tribunal did also not ask the question 
whether there was conduct by Russia which 
‘create[d] reasonable and justifiable expectations 
on the part of [Yukos] to act in reliance on said 
conduct, such that a failure by [Russia] to honour 
those expectations could cause [Yukos] to suffer 
damages’147.
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Of course, any lawbreaker, even the most 
evil criminal, may (also in the absence of explicit 
representations made by the state) legitimately 
expect to get a fair trial and to enjoy the due 
process of law. Nevertheless, the fact that, in 
the view of the Tribunal, the bankruptcy and 
liquidation of Yukos was, after all, brought about 
by a ‘train of mistreatment’148 indicates that the 
core problem might have been rather a lack of due 
process than an expropriation.
bb) Problems concerning the finding  
of attribution
The PCA Tribunal had to ascertain that 
all those actions, which added up to a de facto 
expropriation, were attributable to Russia. In 
this regard, the Tribunal’s analysis seems not to 
be beyond any doubt. In particular, according to 
the PCA Tribunal, Rosneft’s purchase of YNG 
was attributable to Russia because ‘the Russian 
Federation, speaking through its President, 
accepted responsibility for Rosneft’s acquisition 
of YNG and for the auction that underlay it’149. 
In fact, the Tribunal inferred solely from a 
press statement made by the Russian President 
that ‘the State, then 100 percent shareholder of 
Rosneft, the most senior officers of which were 
members of President Putin’s entourage, directed 
that purchase in the interest of the State’150. The 
PCA Tribunal did not disclose the provision 
of the ILC Articles on State Responsibility151 
(hereinafter: ILC Articles) on which it based 
this conclusion.
Perhaps, the Tribunal applied Article 8 ILC 
Articles. In this case, the PCA Tribunal should 
have employed the ‘effective control’ test as 
developed by the ICJ152, which the Tribunal did 
not mention at all, though. Establishing ‘effective 
control’ of Russian public officials over operations 
by Rosneft would have required evidence that 
‘the State was using its ownership interest in 
or control of [Rosneft] specifically in order to 
achieve a particular result’153. The Tribunal 
was well aware that the Russian Federation’s 
ownership of Rosneft in combination with the 
close relationship of some of Rosneft’s senior 
officials to the Russian President ‘does not suffice 
to attribute to the Russian State the actions’ of 
Rosneft154. It was only the ‘remarkable fortuity’155 
of the said press statement made by the Russian 
President prompting the Tribunal to conclude that 
Rosneft’s conduct (i.e. the acquisition of YNG) 
was attributable to the Russian Federation. Indeed, 
with regard to the fact that ‘Rosneft, a 100% state 
owned company, has bought the well-known asset 
of [YNG]’, the Russian President stated that ‘the 
state … is looking after its own interests’156. But 
this is simply an indication that Russia used its 
control of Rosneft specifically in order to acquire 
YNG (and, by doing so, to reverse the results of 
the privatization era at least in part157). In light of 
the ICJ’s jurisprudence158, the ‘effective control’ 
test would have required to show that Russian 
officials gave concrete instructions in respect of 
the acquisition of YNG.
Perhaps, the Tribunal’s intention was to 
avail itself of Article 11 ILC Articles according to 
which conduct is attributable to a state if that state 
‘acknowledges and adopts the conduct in question 
as its own’. In fact, ‘where there are doubts about 
whether certain conduct falls within article 8, 
these may be resolved by the subsequent adoption 
of the conduct in question by the State’159. Indeed, 
the PCA Tribunal stated that Russia had ‘accepted 
responsibility’ for Rosneft’s conduct160. However, 
the wording of ‘article 11 makes it clear that what 
is required is something more than a general 
acknowledgement of a factual situation, but rather 
that the State identifies the conduct in question 
and makes it its own’161. The Russian President’s 
press statement162 does not seem to be as ‘clear 
and unequivocal’ as required under Article 11 of 
the ILC Articles163. Hence, acknowledgement and 
adoption of Rosneft’s conduct by Russia within 
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the meaning of Article 11 of the ILC Articles is 
questionable.
Finally, the PCA Tribunal’s award is almost 
mute on attribution problems with regard to 
the Baikal Finance Group which was the sole 
and winning bidder in the auction of YNG and 
which was taken over by Rosneft within only a 
few days after the auction. The Baikal Finance 
Group’s purchase of YNG was one important 
step in depriving Yukos of its core asset which 
might have secured Yukos’ survival in view of the 
immense tax debts. Apparently, the Tribunal was 
merely able to voice the ‘suspicion that Baikal 
was created by instruments of [Russia] in order to 
facilitate the acquisition of YNG by State-owned 
Rosneft’164. However, the PCA Tribunal seemed 
to have been incapable of concluding firmly that 
also the creation of, and conduct by, the Baikal 
Finance Group was undoubtedly attributable to 
Russia. The Tribunal was content with sweepingly 
stating that not only Rosneft’s conduct, but also 
‘the auction of YNG shares that underlay it’ was 
attributable to Russia165. The attribution of ‘the 
auction of YNG shares’ to Russia might imply 
that also the Baikal Finance Group’s conduct 
was attributable to Russia because part of the 
‘auction of YNG shares’ was their acquisition by 
the Baikal Finance Group.
b) The ECtHR’s holding: unlawful  
and disproportionate interference
In light of the right to property under 
Article 1 ECHR-Prot. 1, the ECtHR reviewed 
both the tax assessment proceedings and the 
enforcement measures taken to collect Yukos’ 
debts arising out these proceedings. Whereas the 
ECtHR considered the imposition of penalties 
with regard to the tax assessments 2000-2001 an 
unlawful interference with the right to property, 
it denounced the enforcement measures to be 
a disproportionate interference with Article 1 
ECHR-Prot. 1. Hence, although the ECtHR is well 
aware of the concept of de facto expropriations 
it refrained from classifying the taxation and 
enforcement measures as such166.
aa) The tax assessments 2000-2003
Concerning the tax assessments 2000-2003, 
the Court emphasizes that ‘it was not in dispute 
between the parties that [they] represented 
an interference with the applicant company’s 
property rights’167. The ECtHR reiterates that, 
in accordance with Article (1)(1)(2) ECHR-Prot. 
1, any such interference must be lawful, i.e. ‘the 
interference should be in compliance with the 
domestic law and … the law itself be of sufficient 
quality to enable an applicant to foresee the 
consequence of his or her conduct’168. Concerning 
the law’s quality, ‘the applicable provisions of 
domestic law [must be] sufficiently accessible, 
precise and foreseeable’.
Regarding the tax assessment 2000, the only 
problem at hand was whether the imposition of 
penalties constituted an unlawful interference 
with Yukos’ right to property169. Under Russian tax 
law, a taxpayer could be held liable only for a three 
year period starting at the end of the tax term170. 
In the present case, the Tax Ministry decided on 
14 April 2004 that Yukos had an outstanding tax 
liability for the year 2000171. This decision ‘was 
clearly outside the above-mentioned three year 
time-limit’172, and, hence, prima facie unlawful.
However, the Russian Constitutional Court 
delivered a decision on 14 July 2005 which 
provided for an unwritten, by then unknown 
exception to the three year time-limit: ‘where the 
taxpayer impedes tax supervision and the conduct 
of tax inspections, the court may excuse the tax 
authorities’ failure to bring the proceedings 
in time’173. In such a case, the tax audit report 
revealing the tax offences would ‘stop the clock’, 
i.e. suspend the three year time-limit174. This 
‘change in the interpretation of the relevant rules 
on the statutory time-limits of the proceedings’ 
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raised the question ‘whether such a change was 
compatible with the requirement of lawfulness of 
Article 1 of Protocol No. 1’175. 
The ECtHR started its analysis by pointing 
out that ‘the 2000 Tax Assessment proceedings 
were criminal in character’176. It admitted that 
the ‘requirement of lawfulness’ as laid down 
in Article 1(1)(2) ECHR-Prot. 1 ‘cannot be 
read as outlawing the gradual clarification of 
the rules of criminal liability through judicial 
interpretation from case to case’177. Concerning 
the Constitutional Court’s decision of 14 July 
2005, however, the ECtHR ‘[was] not persuaded 
that the change in question could have been 
reasonably foreseen’178. Since the Constitutional 
Court ‘had changed the rules applicable at the 
relevant time by creating an exception from a rule 
which had had no previous exceptions’179. This 
violation of Article 1(1)(2) ECHR-Prot. 1 also 
infected the 2001 tax assessment proceedings 
because Yukos’ ‘conviction in the 2000 Tax 
Assessment proceedings laid the basis for finding 
[it] liable for a repeated offence … in the 2001 
Tax Assessment proceedings’180.
In contrast, concerning the tax reassessments 
for the years 2000-2003 as such, the ECtHR 
acknowledged ‘that the findings of the [Russian] 
courts that [Yukos’] tax arrangements were 
unlawful at the time when [it] had used them, were 
neither arbitrary nor manifestly unreasonable’181. 
In particular, the Court accepted the Russian 
courts’ findings that Yukos’ ‘tax optimization’ 
scheme ‘consisted of switching the tax burden 
from the applicant company and its production 
and service units to letter-box companies in 
domestic tax havens in Russia’182. Accordingly, 
in the opinion of the ECtHR, Yukos being ‘a 
large business holding which at the relevant time 
could have been expected to have recourse to 
professional auditors and consultants’183 was not 
taken by surprise when Russian tax authorities 
started to reassess Yukos’ tax liabilities for the 
years 2000-2003184. Consequently, as regards the 
tax reassessments 2000-2003 as such, the Court 
held that the interpretation and application of 
the Russian tax law by Russian authorities was 
neither unreasonable nor unforeseeable and, thus, 
not in violation of Article 1 ECHR-Prot. 1185.
The ECtHR also dismissed Yukos’ claim 
to have been treated in a discriminatory 
way incompatible with Article 14 ECHR in 
conjunction with Article 1 ECHR-Prot. 1186. 
Since Yukos had ‘failed to demonstrate that any 
other companies were in a relevantly similar 
position’187. In this regard, the Court pointed 
once more to the specificities and peculiarities of 
Yukos’ tax evasion scheme as Yukos ‘was found to 
have employed a tax arrangement of considerable 
complexity, involving, among other things, the 
fraudulent use of trading companies registered in 
domestic tax havens’188.
bb) The enforcement measures
From the ECtHR’s point of view, also the 
enforcement measures taken by the Russian 
authorities to recover Yukos’ tax debts, ‘such as 
the attachment and freezing orders, the seizure 
orders, the orders to pay enforcement fees and 
the compulsory auction procedure’, interfered 
with Yukos’ right to property as guaranteed under 
Article 1(1) ECHR-Prot. 1189. Quite similar to the 
PCA Tribunal’s approach190, the ECtHR did not 
review the several measures separately but rather 
chose ‘to examine the enforcement proceedings 
in their entirety as one continuous event’191.
But here is where analogies end. Contrary 
to the PCA Tribunal, the ECtHR did not develop 
the ‘theory’ that Russia intended to break up 
Yukos for political reasons by depriving it of 
its property and assets causing Yukos’ being 
declared bankrupt and, finally, liquidated. 
Rather, the ECtHR explicitly held that there was 
no violation of the ECHR ‘on account of the 
alleged disguised expropriation of the company’s 
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property and the alleged intentional destruction of 
the company itself’192. Thus, the Court overcame 
the temptation to blame Russia for overly harsh 
conduct committed in bad faith. 
The Court applied Article 1(1)(2) ECHR-
Prot. 1 according to which ‘[n]o one shall be 
deprived of his possessions except in the public 
interest and subject to the conditions provided 
for by law’. In addition, the ECtHR referred to 
Article 1(2) ECHR-Prot. 1 which stipulates that 
the right to property ‘shall not … in any way 
impair the right of a State to enforce such laws as 
it deems necessary … to secure the payment of 
taxes’. Consequently, the Court had to examine, 
first, ‘whether the State authorities complied with 
the Convention requirement of lawfulness’ and, 
second, ‘if so, whether they struck a fair balance 
between the legitimate state interest in enforcing 
the tax debt in question and the protection of the 
applicant company’s rights set forth in Article 1 
of Protocol No. 1’193.
Unlike the PCA Tribunal, the ECtHR did 
not question that the enforcement measures taken 
by the Russian authorities were, in principle, 
lawful. In particular, ‘throughout the proceedings 
the actions of various authorities had a lawful 
basis and … the legal provisions in question 
were sufficiently precise and clear to meet the 
Convention standards concerning the quality of 
law’194. In addition, the Court did not cast the 
Russian courts’ role into doubt which constantly 
upheld all these measures195. In contrast, the PCA 
Tribunal found strong indications ‘that Russian 
courts bent to the will of Russian executive 
authorities to bankrupt Yukos [and] assign its 
assets to a State-controlled company’196. Thus, 
the PCA Tribunal accused the Russian courts of 
not having acted independently and impartially.
Furthermore, the ECtHR held that Russia 
did not violate Article 18 ECHR which prohibits 
the abuse of the power of Convention parties to 
restrict the Convention rights and freedoms197. 
In contrast, the PCA Tribunal apparently opined 
that the Russian authorities abused the Russian 
tax and enforcement rules by holding that ‘the 
primary objective of the Russian Federation was 
not to collect taxes but rather to bankrupt Yukos 
and appropriate its valuable assets’198.
As opposed to the PCA Tribunal, the ECtHR 
did not discuss whether the enforcement measures 
adopted by the Russian authorities amounted to a 
de facto expropriation. Rather, from the Court’s 
perspective, the remaining and decisive question 
was ‘whether the enforcement measures were 
proportionate to the legitimate aim pursued’199. 
The ECtHR acknowledges ‘that in the tax sphere 
the Contracting States should enjoy a wide 
margin of appreciation in order to implement 
their policies’200. This does not imply, of course, 
that the Court should refrain from judicial 
review altogether. To the contrary, the Court 
has to determine ‘whether the requisite [sc. fair] 
balance was maintained in a manner consonant 
with [Yukos’] right to “the peaceful enjoyment of 
[its] possessions”, within the meaning of the first 
sentence of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1’201.
In the end, the ECtHR made a persuasive 
case that the ‘domestic authorities failed to 
strike a fair balance between the legitimate 
aims sought and the measures employed’202. The 
Court accepted without any qualification that the 
Russian authorities pursued a legitimate public 
policy objective namely the collection of taxes, 
in particular of tax debts203. However, the ECtHR 
was not satisfied with the measures employed for 
achieving that goal. In the opinion of the Court, 
both the tax authorities and the judicial organs 
overlooked certain material factors which should 
have been taken into due account in favour of 
Yukos. The Court identified especially three such 
factors. It criticized, first, that by auctioning 
YNG the Russian authorities chose the deadliest 
option instead of seriously considering whether 
other less fatal options were available204. Second, 
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the Court deemed the enforcement fee, a flat-
rate fee of 7 % amounting to over 1.16 billion 
Euro, to be ‘by its nature unrelated to the actual 
amount of the enforcement expenses’ and to 
be ‘completely out of proportion to the amount 
of the enforcement expenses … borne by the 
bailiffs’205. Third, the ECtHR was not convinced 
that the Russian authorities really had to act as 
inflexible, rigid and apace as they did during the 
enforcement proceedings without leaving Yukos 
the possibility to take a breather.206 Thus, the 
enforcement measures as a whole exercised a 
suffocating impact on Yukos.
Consequently, the ECtHR found that Russia 
had violated the right to property under Article 
1 ECHR-Prot. 1. Unlike the PCA Tribunal, the 
ECtHR did not hold that an unlawful de facto 
expropriation had occurred207. Rather, the Court 
only concluded that Russia had exercised its ‘right 
… to enforce … laws as it deems necessary … to 
secure the payment of taxes’ within the meaning 
of Article 1(2) ECHR-Prot. 1 in a disproportionate 
way. This finding, of course, has significant 
implications for the question of compensation. If 
there was no de iure or de facto expropriation, 
any damages to be paid to Yukos did not need to 
encompass the whole value of Yukos’ complete 
assets and the value of Yukos as such, i.e. as an 
enterprise.
2. Fair trial
The PCA Tribunal did not decide on fair 
trial issues separately from property issues. 
According to the Tribunal’s reasoning, Russia 
frustrated Yukos’ legitimate expectations to 
be treated pursuant to accepted due process 
standards, especially without unwarranted arrests 
of senior employees and undue impediment of the 
work of Yukos’ legal counsel208. This finding was 
decisive for the Tribunal’s conclusion that Yukos 
was the victim of a de facto expropriation209. In 
addition, the PCA Tribunal held that the ‘effective 
expropriation’ of Yukos was not ‘carried out 
under due process of law’ within the meaning 
of Article 13(1)(1)(c) ECT210. In its reasoning, 
the Tribunal explained that, e.g., the ‘harsh 
treatment’ accorded to Yukos’ top managers, ‘the 
mistreatment of counsel of Yukos’ and ‘the very 
pace of the legal proceedings’ did ‘not comport 
with the due process of law’211.
Hence, based, at least in part, on the same set 
of events, the PCA Tribunal made use twice of the 
fact that violations of due process had occurred. 
From a doctrinal point of view, ‘carrying out’ an 
expropriation in violation of due process of law 
within the meaning of Article 13(1)(1)(c) ECT 
should be distinguished from the ‘effecting’ of a 
de facto expropriation through violations of due 
process of law. From the Tribunal’s perspective, 
the de facto expropriation of Yukos’ assets was 
the result of a series of infringements of due 
process principles, i.e. from the Tribunal’s 
perspective, the expropriation would not 
have occurred but by the Russian authorities’ 
disregard of due process. Accordingly, in light 
of the PCA Tribunal’s reasoning, the violation 
of due process is a constitutive element of the de 
facto expropriation. In contrast, violations of due 
process within the meaning of Article 13(1)(1)(c) 
ECT form a constitutive element of the lawfulness 
of an expropriation. In short, the Tribunal relied 
on more or less the same violations of due 
process in order to establish, first, that a de facto 
expropriation had occurred and, second, that this 
expropriation was unlawful.
Taking into account the PCA Tribunal’s 
own ‘theory’ of events as well as the Tribunal’s 
reasoning underlying its finding of an unlawful 
de facto expropriation, the Tribunal should have 
preferred to apply the ‘fair and equitable treatment’ 
clause (hereinafter: FET clause) laid down in 
Article 10(1)(2) ECT. Since, from the Tribunal’s 
point of view, the core legal issue apparently 
was that Russian tax authorities and courts 
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subjected Yukos to tax measures and enforcement 
proceedings which were not in conformity with 
due process principles and fair trial standards. 
The application of the FET clause would have 
been also in line with certain investment 
arbitration precedents construing the concept of 
de facto expropriation narrowly and shifting legal 
problems to the FET clause212. Actually, according 
to current case law, the concept of FET relates 
to, e.g., ‘legitimate expectations’, ‘due process’ 
or ‘freedom of coercion and harassment’213. 
Instead, the Tribunal preferred to engage in an 
expropriation analysis under Article 13 ECT and, 
for reasons of judicial economy, refrained from 
considering breaches of Article 10(1) ECT214.
In contrast to the PCA tribunal, the ECtHR 
examined whether the Russian courts adhered to 
the right to a fair trial under Article 6 ECHR and, 
in the end, found Russia in violation of Article 
6(1) and (3)(b) ECHR215. The ECtHR reiterated 
that ‘the principle of equality of arms is one 
feature of the wider concept of a fair trial’. Article 
6(3)(b) ECHR is a specification of this principle. 
It provides that parties to a dispute must ‘have 
adequate time and facilities for the preparation of 
[their] defence’. The Court admitted that ‘it is no 
doubt important to conduct proceedings at good 
speed’216. However, ‘this should not be done at 
the expense of the procedural rights of one of the 
parties’217. In light of the specific circumstances of 
the case, especially with regard to its ‘magnitude 
and complexity’218, the Russian trial court 
failed ‘to ensure that [Yukos] had a sufficiently 
long period of time during which it could study 
[the] voluminous case file and prepare for the 
trial hearings’219. This deficiency was neither 
acknowledged nor remedied by the appeal court 
which, for its part, did not comply with Article 6(3)
(b) ECHR ‘on account of the restricted time for 
preparation of the appeal hearing’220. The Court 
stated that ‘the early beginning of the appeal 
hearing impeded [Yukos’] ability to prepare and 
present properly its case on appeal’221. Likewise, 
the cassation court did not take any corrective 
action222. It seems noteworthy that the Court, 
however, also rejected some of Yukos’ complaints 
because of their being ‘vague and unspecific’ or 
‘unsubstantiated’223.
VI. Damages
It has already been pointed out at the 
very beginning of this article that the most 
striking difference between the PCA Tribunal’s 
awards and the ECtHR’s judgments concerns 
the damages adjudged to the claimants or the 
applicant respectively.
1. The PCA Tribunal’s approach
First of all, the PCA Tribunal outlined the 
normative bases for the claimants’ entitlement 
to damages. Having found Russia in breach 
of Article 13(1)(1) ECT and, thus, liable for 
an internationally wrongful act, the Tribunal 
correctly referred to the ILC Articles to decide 
on the legal consequences arising out of Russia’s 
international responsibility224. Pursuant to 
Article 31(1) of the ILC Articles, Russia was 
‘under an obligation to make full reparation for 
the injury caused by the internationally wrongful 
act’. However, according to Article 39 of the ILC 
Articles, ‘[i]n the determination of reparation, 
account shall be taken of the contribution to the 
injury by wilful or negligent action or omission 
of … any person or entity in relation to whom 
reparation is sought’.
Accordingly, the Tribunal entered into the 
analysis whether there was any ‘contributory 
fault’ on the side of claimants, i.e. fault that 
contributed materially to Yukos’ destruction225. 
From the Tribunal’s perspective, there was at 
least a ‘sufficient causal link’ between Yukos’ 
‘tax optimization’ scheme abusing the ‘low-tax 
region programme’ (the abuse being enlarged 
by Yukos’ ‘questionable use of the Cyprus-
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Russia DTA’226), and Yukos’ demise227. Hence, 
the Tribunal took the view that claimants 
‘should pay a price for Yukos’ abuse’228. 
Stressing ‘its wide discretion’, balancing 
Russia’s and the claimants’ responsibilities for 
Yukos’ destruction, the PCA Tribunal assessed 
the claimants’ contributory fault to amount to 
‘25 percent’229. This estimate of contributory 
fault on the part of the claimants seems to 
be somewhat arbitrary. Since the reasoning 
does not offer a comprehensible rationale 
except for a very vague reference to ‘all the 
evidence’230 and ‘all the arguments the Parties 
have presented … in respect of this issue’231. Of 
course, admittedly, contributory fault is ‘only 
with difficulty commensurable’232. 
On the basis of this finding, ‘full reparation’ 
within the meaning of Article 31(1) of the ILC 
Articles had to be reduced by 25 percent. Pursuant 
to Article 34 of the ILC Articles, ‘reparation’ 
may take three different forms: restitution, 
compensation and satisfaction. According 
to Article 13(1)(2) ECT, ‘compensation shall 
amount to the … value of the [i]nvestment … at 
the … “[v]aluation [d]ate”’. Article 13(1)(2) ECT 
defines the term ‘valuation date’ as meaning the 
‘time immediately before the [e]xpropriation 
or impending [e]xpropriation became known 
in such a way as to affect the value of the 
[i]nvestment’. In the present case of a ‘creeping 
expropriation’233, the date of expropriation is 
typically difficult to establish. With regard 
to a ‘creeping expropriation’, i.e. a de facto 
expropriation ‘through a series of actions’234, 
the expropriation date is to be determined by 
the date on which the series of incriminating 
acts crosses the threshold beyond which the acts 
get tantamount to an expropriation235. From the 
Tribunal’s point of view, this threshold was the 
auction of YNG on 19 December 2004. Since 
‘YNG was Yukos’ main production asset and 
its loss … marked a substantial and irreversible 
diminution of Claimants’ investment’236, i.e. of 
claimant’s shares in Yukos.
The PCA Tribunal, however, also held that 
the date of expropriation was not the only possible 
valuation date237. It derived from the wording of 
Article 13(1)(2) ECT (‘such compensation’238) 
that the valuation date as legally defined in 
Article 13(1)(2) ECT applied only to lawful 
expropriations (i.e. such expropriations which 
conform to the legality requirements of Article 
13(1)(1) ECT one of them being ‘prompt, 
adequate and effective compensation’239, i.e. 
the so-called ‘Hull formula’240). In the present 
case of an unlawful de facto expropriation 
committed in breach of the ECT, i.e. of a treaty 
of public international law, the law on state 
responsibility as reflected in the ILC Articles 
had to be applied241. According to the law on 
state responsibility, from the Tribunal’s point 
of view, the claimants were entitled ‘to choose 
between a valuation as of the expropriation date 
and as of the date of the award’242.
However, the Tribunal’s application of the 
law on state responsibility, namely of Article 
35 of the ILC Articles, was questionable. The 
Tribunal opined that ‘restitution’ within the 
meaning of Article 35 of the ILC Articles means 
‘putting the injured party into the position that 
it would be in if the wrongful act had not taken 
place’243. This is neither in compliance with the 
wording of Article 35 of the ILC Articles (‘re-
establish the situation which existed before [sic!] 
the wrongful act was committed’) nor with the 
ILC’s own interpretation of this clause. According 
to the ILC’s commentary, ‘restitution consists 
in re-establishing the status quo ante, i.e. the 
situation that existed prior to the occurrence of 
the wrongful act’ but not in the ‘reestablishment 
of the situation that would have existed if the 
wrongful act had not been committed’244. Thus, 
contrary to the PCA Tribunal’s view, Article 35 of 
the ILC Articles does not require ‘a hypothetical 
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inquiry into what the situation would have been if 
the wrongful act had not been committed’245.
However, ‘restitution’ within the meaning 
of Article 35 of the ILC Articles ‘may of course 
have to be completed by compensation in 
order to ensure full reparation for the damage 
caused, as article 36 makes clear’246. According 
to Article 36(1) of the ILC Articles, Russia had 
to compensate for all damages caused by the 
wrongful de facto expropriation ‘insofar as such 
damage [was] not made good by restitution’. 
Obviously, re-establishing Yukos as a stock 
company as it had existed before the auction 
of YNG on 19 December 2004 had become 
materially impossible247 at the point of time 
when the Tribunal delivered its award. For 
valuation purposes only, the Tribunal referred 
to 30 June 2014 as the date of the award248. 
Even if such reestablishment of Yukos had been 
possible, the value of the claimants’ investment, 
i.e. their shares in Yukos, might have been 
worth less on the date of the award (30 June 
2014) compared to the date of expropriation (19 
December 2004). Any such loss in value would 
have had to be considered financially assessable 
material damage within the meaning of Articles 
31(2), 36(2) of the ILC Articles and, therefore, 
would have had to be compensated for under 
Article 36(1) of the ILC Articles. The reason 
is not ‘that in the absence of the expropriation 
the [claimants] could have sold [their shares] at 
an earlier date at its previous higher value’249, 
but simply that Russia had to restore the status 
quo ante which included the value of the shares 
in Yukos as of the earlier date of expropriation. 
However, in case the reestablishment of Yukos 
had been possible, the value of the claimants’ 
shares in Yukos also might have been higher as 
of the date of the award (30 June 2014) compared 
to the date of expropriation (19 December 
2004). Thus, restoring the status quo ante, i.e. 
re-establishing Yukos as a stock company as it 
had existed just before the auction of YNG on 19 
December 2004, might have implied an accidental 
enrichment of the claimants as of the date of the 
award. This justified, from the Tribunal’s point 
of view, also ‘compensation in the amount of the 
asset’s higher value’ ‘where the asset cannot be 
returned’250 like in the present case. Hence, the 
Tribunal concluded that the claimants had the 
right ‘to choose between a valuation [of their 
shares in Yukos] as of the expropriation date and 
as of the date of the award’251.
Among the several valuation methods 
proposed by the claimants252, the PCA Tribunal 
chose to apply the ‘comparable companies 
method’253. On the basis of this method, the 
Tribunal estimated that the equity value of Yukos 
amounted to approximately 61.076 billion USD 
as of 27 November 2007254, i.e. the day on which 
Yukos was struck off the Russian companies’ 
register255. Yukos’ value on the valuation dates 
(i.e. on 19 December 2004 and on 30 June 2014 
respectively) was calculated by the use of a 
multiplier reflecting the development of the RTS 
Oil & Gas index256.
Besides the value of the claimants’ shares in 
Yukos (on the date, both, of the expropriation and 
of the award), the PCA Tribunal also took into 
account the value of the ‘lost’ dividends which 
would have been paid to the claimants by Yukos in 
the absence of the de facto expropriation257. Based 
on the valuation expertise provided by two experts 
designated by the parties to the dispute, the PCA 
Tribunal, stressing once more its ‘discretion’, 
fixed the dividend payments which Yukos would 
have presumably paid to its shareholders for 
each year from 2004 to the first half of 2014258. 
According to the Tribunal’s determination, the 
dividends would have amounted to 2.5 billion in 
2004 and would have added up to 45 billion USD 
for the whole period between 2004 and 2014 (first 
half)259. This sum was even less than the amount 
calculated by Russia’s valuation expert (not to 
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mention the amount figured up by the claimants’ 
valuation expert)260.
In addition, and in line with Article 38 of 
the ILC Articles, the damages awarded by the 
Tribunal had to include (pre-award) interest as 
well261. Based on the ‘average yield of ten-year 
U.S. Treasury bonds over the period from 1 
January 2005 to 30 May 2014’, the PCA Tribunal 
determined that the applicable rate of interest was 
3.389 percent262.
All in all, the results of the PCA Tribunal’s 
calculation were that ‘[t]he total amount of 
Claimants’ damages based on a valuation date 
of 19 December 2004 is USD 21.988 billion, 
whereas the total amount of their damages based 
on a valuation date of 30 June 2014 is USD 66.694 
billion’263. As the claimants were entitled to choose 
the valuation date and, thus, the higher amount of 
damages, the higher sum of 66.694 billion USD 
had to be reduced by 25 percent in accordance 
with claimants’ contributory fault264. As a result, 
the Tribunal awarded claimants the tremendous 
amount of 50.021 billion USD265.
2. The ECtHR’s approach
The legal basis for ordering the respondent 
state to pay compensation to the applicant is 
Article 41 ECHR pursuant to which the Court has 
the power ‘to afford just satisfaction to the injured 
party’. However, according to the ECtHR, for 
lack of a ‘causal link between the violation found 
and the pecuniary damage allegedly sustained 
by [Yukos]’, the violation of Article 6(1), (3)(b) 
ECHR did not entail an obligation of Russia to 
pay damages to Yukos266.
In contrast, the penalties imposed on Yukos 
with regard to the 2000-2001 tax assessments in 
violation of Article 1(1)(2) ECHR-Prot.1 resulted 
in effective payments by Yukos267. Accordingly, 
the Court ordered Russia to reimburse Yukos for 
these sums under Article 41 ECHR268. The same 
had to apply to the 7 % enforcement fee which 
Yukos was ordered to pay, and effectively paid269, 
on top of those penalties. Since the unlawfulness 
of the penalties under Article 1(1)(2) ECHR-Prot. 
1 extended to the 7 % enforcement fee imposed 
with respect to the aforementioned penalties 
for the years 2000-2001270. The retroactively 
imposed penalties amounted to approximately 
1.078 billion EUR271 and the 7 % enforcement 
fees to about 75.477 million EUR272. For the 
purpose of calculating the compensation due, 
the Court also took into account the inflation 
rate of 12.62 % for the euro. Thus, all in all, the 
damage sustained by Yukos amounted to about 
1.277 billion EUR273.
The decisive question, however, was how 
the ECtHR would deal with damages caused by 
the enforcement proceedings at the very end of 
which Yukos was liquidated and which the Court 
had held to have been exercised in violation of 
Article 1(2) ECHR-Prot. 1. In fact, the ECtHR 
recognized that the defects of the enforcement 
measures ‘very seriously contributed to [Yukos’] 
demise’274. In its own judgment, the choice of YNG 
‘as the first item to be auctioned in satisfaction 
of [Yukos’] liability’275 decisively accounted 
for the disproportionality and, thus, for the 
wrongfulness of the enforcement proceedings276. 
Accordingly, the Court could have held that the 
damage resulting from the wrongfulness of the 
enforcement proceedings comprised any damage 
Yukos suffered from the deprivation of YNG. 
Nevertheless, the Court refrained from taking 
into account whether and to what extent the 
auctioning of YNG caused pecuniary damage to 
Yukos.
The Court only considered the 
disproportionate 7 % enforcement fee for the years 
2000-2003 which totalled about 1.253 billion 
EUR277. By deducting the 7 % enforcement fees 
for the years 2000-2001 of about 75.477 million 
EUR mentioned above278 the Court arrived at 
the figure of approximately 1.177 billion EUR279. 
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In line with Russia’s submissions, the Court 
considered an enforcement fee of 4 % to be 
proportionate280. Accordingly, the pecuniary loss 
of Yukos amounted to the difference between 
the 4 % enforcement fee and the amount of 
1.177 billion EUR, i.e. to about 503.268 million 
EUR281. Taking into account the said inflation 
rate of 12.62 %, Yukos’ damage added up to 
approximately 566.780 million EUR282.
Contrary to the PCA Tribunal, the Court 
rejected to enter into any further speculations 
about Yukos’ prospects to survive the enforcement 
proceedings and its value after all those events.283 
Therefore, the ECtHR held that the pecuniary 
damage suffered by Yukos was limited to about 
1.866 billion EUR284 and ‘rejected the remainder 
of [Yukos’] claim … as unsubstantiated’285. Since 
Yukos had ceased to exist, the ECtHR decided 
that the beneficiaries of Russia’s liability ought 
to be Yukos’ former shareholders or their legal 
successors respectively.286
Interestingly, unlike the PCA Tribunal, the 
ECtHR did not take into account contributory fault 
on the part of Yukos because it ‘ha[d] already been 
held liable … in the various tax and enforcement 
proceedings’287. The Court also declined to take 
into account any outstanding liabilities of Yukos 
or the final arbitral awards delivered in two 
Yukos cases before the Arbitration Institute of the 
Stockholm Chamber of Commerce288. Hence, at 
least ‘in the context of the present judgment and 
at this stage of the proceedings’289, the ECtHR did 
not deal with Russia’s submissions concerning 
the ‘risk of double compensation’290.
VII. Concluding remarks
This comparative case note on the Yukos 
cases is based on an analysis of two arbitral 
awards issued by the PCA Tribunal (one interim 
award on jurisdiction and admissibility as well 
as one final award)291 and three decisions by 
the ECtHR (one decision on jurisdiction and 
admissibility, one judgment primarily on the 
merits and one judgment on just satisfaction). All 
those decisions taken together amount to more 
than an incredible 1,100 pages. Thus, this article 
did not intend to provide an in-depth review of 
any and every aspect dealt with in the decisions. 
Rather, the objective of this contribution was to 
focus on some of those aspects which may shed 
light on the different approaches of the ECtHR 
on the one hand and of the PCA Tribunal on the 
other hand.
To a certain extent, the strikingly different 
outcomes of the Yukos cases before the ECtHR 
and the PCA Tribunal can be explained by the 
different fields of law applied by the two bodies. 
The PCA Tribunal availed itself of the concept 
of de facto expropriation, i.e. a concept which 
is well-established in international investment 
law. In contrast, the ECtHR refrained from 
assuming that Yukos was the victim of a de 
facto expropriation and, rather, held that Russia 
was liable for unlawful and disproportionate 
infringements of the human right to property. 
This difference concerning the classification 
of Russia’s interference with Yukos’ (or its 
shareholders’) property almost necessarily 
results in significant discrepancies with respect 
to the amount of damages. Since, in the present 
case, the calculation of compensation for a de 
facto expropriation of shareholders necessitated, 
inter alia, the valuation of a multi-billion stock 
company whereas the calculation of damages 
arising from an unlawful and disproportionate 
interference with property rights only required 
to reimburse those sums of money which had 
been collected by public authorities unlawfully.
From a procedural perspective, the 
gathering of evidence, especially the hearing of 
fact witnesses, led the PCA Tribunal to frame its 
‘theory’ that Russia intended to smash Yukos for 
political reason thereby abusing its tax law and 
related enforcement proceedings. In contrast, the 
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ECtHR abstained from such severe allegations 
and, thus, from taking sides in intricate political 
battles. In particular, the ECtHR repeatedly 
respected Russia’s wide margin of discretion 
in the complex and sensitive field of taxation 
and widely (albeit not fully) accepted both 
Russian tax law and enforcement rules and their 
application by public authorities and domestic 
courts.
To a certain extent, these remarkable 
differences are related to the differing 
procedures before the ECtHR and the PCA 
Tribunal respectively as well as to the 
diverging roles of the two bodies. The ECtHR 
functions more like a constitutional court 
exercising, as the case may be, judicial self-
restraint vis-à-vis the respondent state. The 
PCA Tribunal rather acted like a civil court 
of first instance by hearing fact witnesses 
called by the claimants and reproaching Russia 
with not having called ‘fact witnesses of their 
own to contradict or weaken the testimony of 
Claimants’292. Accordingly, in investor-state 
dispute settlements before international arbitral 
tribunals, host states have to take a very active 
role in establishing the facts of the case. Since 
fact-finding predetermines the application of 
the law and, thus, the tribunal’s holding.
Of course, pragmatically speaking, the 
ECtHR must treat the parties to the ECHR 
more respectfully than an international arbitral 
tribunal the parties to an international investment 
agreement. The ECtHR’s mission is to ensure 
perpetual compliance with the ECHR by the 
Convention parties. Therefore, its judgments must 
meet with continuous acceptance by the states. On 
the other hand, also arbitrators should not ‘slap’ 
investors’ host states without overwhelmingly 
persuasive cause. Since, in the long run, states 
may get disgusted with investment arbitration 
and, in the end, bury investor-state dispute 
settlement all together.
In the future, we may well encounter further 
cases like the Yukos cases. According to latest 
UNCTAD293 reports, foreign investors increasingly 
tend to file claims against developed states.294 
Such states usually possess a sophisticated legal 
framework for the protection of individual rights, 
or are embedded in an international human rights 
regime such as the ECHR. At the same time, 
such states are parties to ever closer networks of 
international investment agreements including 
regional free trade agreements. Germany may 
serve as an example: Germany’s law on the 
phasing-out of nuclear power plants has been 
challenged both before the Federal Constitutional 
Court (for violations of individual rights 
under the German constitution295) and before 
an international ICSID296 arbitral Tribunal297 
established on the basis of Article 26 ECT. If the 
Federal Constitutional Court does not nullify 
the law, the applicants may subsequently file an 
individual complaint with the ECtHR. Thus, 
the same legislative measure and its impacts 
will be scrutinized by different judicial bodies 
on the basis of different rules, i.e. national 
fundamental rights laid down in the constitution, 
international human rights set forth in the ECHR 
and international investors’ rights arising from 
the ECT.
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Рассмотрение дел компании «ЮКОС».  
Сравнительный анализ решений Европейского суда  
по правам человекам  
и Постоянной палаты третейского суда 
Ханс-Георг Дедерер
Пассау, Германия 
Решения, вынесенные Европейским судом по правам человека по делам компании «ЮКОС» 
в 2009, 2011 и 2014 гг., и решения международного арбитражного трибунала, вынесенные 
Постоянной палатой третейского суда в 2009 и 2014 гг., требуют сравнительного анализа. 
Два суда пришли к достаточно различным решениям, особенно в части возмещения убытков 
со стороны России: согласно трибуналу, Россия должна выплатить компенсацию в размере 
приблизительно 50 миллиардов долларов США, в то время как ЕСПЧ обязал Россию выплатить 
компенсацию в размере всего лишь 2 миллиардов евро. Тем не менее обстоятельства дела, 
принимаемые во внимание при вынесении решений ЕСПЧ и ППТС, не различались. Российские 
власти применили в отношении компании «ЮКОС» повторное налогообложение и связанные 
с ним принудительные меры, признанные законными в российских судах. В конце концов 
компания «ЮКОС» была объявлена банкротом и ликвидирована. Значительные различия между 
решениями можно объяснить, в некоторой степени, различными правовыми базами, лежащими 
в основе принятия решений. ЕСПЧ руководствовался Европейской конвенцией о защите прав 
человека (ЕКЗПЧ) и связанными с ней дополнительными протоколами (протоколы ЕКЗПЧ), 
т.е. инструментами в области прав человека, в то время как Постоянная палата третейского 
суда была обязана применить положения о защите инвестиций Договора к Энергетической 
Хартии (ДЭХ). Трибунал классифицировал повторное налогообложение и связанные с ним 
принудительные меры как «ползучую» фактическую экспроприацию (статья 13 ДЭХ), 
тогда как Европейский суд постановил, что эти меры представляли собой исключительно 
незаконное и несоразмерное вмешательство в право собственности (статья 1 протокола 1 
ЕКЗПЧ). Соответственно, с точки зрения трибунала Россия должна была компенсировать 
стоимость компании «ЮКОС» как многомиллиардного акционерного общества. В отличие от 
этого решения, по мнению Европейского суда Россия была обязана возместить необоснованное 
налогообложение и оплату исполнительных сборов. ЕСПЧ также заявил, что Россия нарушила 
право на справедливое судебное разбирательство (статья 6 ЕКЗПЧ). Арбитражный суд, 
напротив, не рассматривал процессуальные нарушения отдельно, хотя это было возможно, 
например, в рамках пункта о «справедливом и равноправном отношении» (cтатья 10 (1) (2) ДЭХ). 
Отличительной особенностью аргументации Арбитражного суда было «кредо» арбитров, что 
Россия намеревалась недобросовестно ликвидировать «ЮКОС» по политическим причинам. 
Арбитражный суд пришел к этому выводу на основе многочисленных показаний свидетелей, 
вызванных истцами. ЕСПЧ, напротив, воздержались от любых гипотез о политических 
мотивах повторного налогообложения и связанных с ним принудительных мерах, принятых 
российскими властями и подтвержденных российскими судами.
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